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The paper is result of research different cross-border electricity trading mechan-
isms impact. Focus is on investments in generation and transmission power sys-
tem facilities in regional market. Assumptions include efficient market coupling 
mechanism (with more bidding zones), use of additional investment indicators 
(like social welfare and congestion cost) and security of supply issues (capacity 
mechanisms). There is discussion on cost benefits analysis for particular market 
participants and there is possibility of risk reduction for regional power system 
expansion. It is shown current state-of-the-art, problems and trends in solving 
some aspects of market integration and investment issues. In some cases smaller 
and well defined bidding areas are absolutely essential in order to ensure system 
security and economic efficiency. There is no single criterion for power system 
expansion but it is possible to use combination of incentive schemes and possible 
through one index for cross-border trade. Risk management for cross-border 
electricity trading through several areas needs to be upgraded with use of finan-
cial transmission rights like weighted average area prices, respectively. Regional 
power system security is closely associated with timely investments in energy 
supply in line with economic development and environmental needs. Security of 
supply indicator is deriving an estimation of security of supply improvement from 
the market based simulation results when a generation or transmission invest-
ment project is implemented. All researched makes market integration and in-
vestments in Europe more efficient and gives more correct signals to market par-
ticipants in regional market. 
Key words:  investments, regional power market, bidding zones, 
cross-border electricity trading, congestion cost,  
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Introduction 
A well-functioning energy market should provide price signals which promote effi-
cient investments in regional power market and security of supply. Market mechanisms like 
congestion management mechanism, transits via few areas, investments in generation and 
transmission power system facilities and risk management are influencing electricity trading 
and investment solutions. Solutions in European electricity markets are converging to market 
coupling firstly via regions and after region coupling in single electricity market. Although 
the situation is better in comparison to start of liberalization process there are still different 
imbalances which can be solved with more efficient mechanisms. This paper is researching 
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possibilities of efficient electricity trading mechanisms through improved models and crite-
ria’s and via examples on simpler simulations is shown benefits and costs for different market 
participants (generators, suppliers, system operators) and is better illustrated impacts of com-
mercial and physical flows, market mechanism interactions and risk division as well as in-
vestment conditions. Implementation of those solutions could be established efficient regional 
market with impacts on market participants through criterion of social welfare.  
On this topic is several literature especially regarding investments or optimal expan-
sion of generation and transmission infrastructure and few of them is regarding bidding zone 
configuration. A short review of several research publications on the topic is shown in the 
paper and here in introduction are shown few remarks on main and additional papers con-
nected with the topic. Main reference papers are [1-21] and additional papers indirectly con-
nected with the topic are [22-36] including journals referred in SCI. 
The Electricity Regulatory Forum (Florence Forum) is currently addressing cross-
border trade of electricity, in particular the tarification of cross-border electricity exchanges 
and the management of scarce interconnection capacity. Possible solutions regarding efficient 
investment in generation and transmission and security of supply are integration of rene-
wables into the market (power exchanges), Energy Infrastructure Package, Region-
al/European Union (EU) generation adequacy assessment, EU compatibility criteria for Ca-
pacity Remuneration Mechanisms according to Eurelectric, and efficient congestion manage-
ment mechanisms (with better definition of bidding zones), inclusion of social welfare incen-
tive, wide use of financial transmission rights and introduction of security of supply indicator 
– this topics are explained in the paper. 
Basic criterion for market integration is: benefits ≥ costs. Golden rule: the easiest to 
implement provide the most benefit. It is necessary to have a broad perspective and consider 
both technical and economic elements and market. There are inter-relationships between me-
chanisms for congestion management, transit, trading, investments, and tariffs. How do these 
models interact? Power exchanges have boost electricity trading as well as continued market 
integration process. Markets in different stage of development and liquidity on power ex-
changes also impact on electricity market development. Investors look on long term signals 
via physical and financial products – hedging future risks. Presently, power markets receive 
distorted market signals and in some cases peak prices are lower than base prices as well as 
the difference between peak prices and base prices are less and less. Final end-user prices are 
on the rise while wholesale prices are going down (taxes and levies are piling up) – e. g. 
wholesale price is only 15% of the total end-customer price in Germany [1]. 
Regulation on Trans-European Energy Infrastructure Guidelines addresses infra-
structure challenges to ensure true interconnection in the internal market, integration of ener-
gy from variable renewable sources and enhanced security of supply. For projects identified 
as projects of common interest (PCI), the Regulation introduces measures to accelerate per-
mitting procedures, including through a maximum time-limit and streamlining of environ-
mental assessment procedures. The Regulation also provides better incentives to investors 
through enhanced regulatory provisions, and it sets the conditions for EU financial assistance 
under the proposed Connecting Europe Facility [2]. 
The lack of proper price signals to market participants leads to the sub-optimal utili-
zation of networks and generation resources, and also to sub-optimal investment signals. 
ACER (Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators) Framework guidelines on capacity 
allocation and congestion management (2011) and ENTSO-E (European Network of Trans-
mission System Operators for Electricity) Network Code on capacity allocation and conges-Andročec, I., et al.: Mechanisms for Efficient Investments and Optimal Zones in... 
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tion management (2012) is trying to make more efficient congestion management methods 
with impact on market participants. Bidding zones should be along structural congestion lines 
rather than national borders. European countries use zonal pricing with different implementa-
tion: price zones fixed and equal to country (e. g. Germany, Belgium, France); price zones 
fixed, but several zones within a country (e. g. Italy, Norway, Sweden); smaller price zones 
flexible according to network congestion or full nodal pricing (under investigation). 
It is known from literature that bigger bidding zones (like Germany) would be better 
split to at least two zones and reality is that this zone is even bigger (Germany and Austria is 
single price zone) and neighboring countries have additional physical flows (loop flow) 
through their zones which impact on capacities,  market and congestion rent. This splitting of 
Germany could be optimal for Central East European countries, but might not be optimal 
outcome for Austria, Switzerland, Denmark and Sweden. So, this improvement of market 
mechanisms for investment in electricity infrastructure has always two sides, but costs, bene-
fits and social welfare of both sides together needs to be addressed. It is shown mechanism for 
optimal zones based on combination of nodal price calculation and zonal price calculation 
based on location of transmission congestion and area/node price difference – if prices are 
similar more nodes/areas make one zone (flexible bidding zones). 
Paper researches additional criteria for optimal power system expansion especially 
for investments in cross-border transmission projects and power plants investments. Possible 
criteria are connected to maximization of social welfare, congestion cost and hours between 
areas (bidding zones), investment indicator, security of supply, and its impact as short and 
long term signals for use through appropriate financial mechanisms. There is no single crite-
rion for power system expansion but it is possible to use combination of incentive schemes 
and possible through one index for cross-border trade. It is researched between regulated and 
merchant investments and there are shown positive and negative examples of cross-border 
interconnection investments in regional market. There is discussion on cost benefits analysis 
for particular market participants and there is possibility of risk reduction for power system 
expansion [3]. 
Congestion cost and social welfare are firstly recognized as important parts of op-
timal power expansion and bidding zone configuration in the Nordic area in the last decade. 
First focus was on the definition of price areas in Norway, which resulted splitting from three 
to five price areas. Second focus was on the definition of price areas in Sweden, which re-
sulted splitting in four price areas, after the European Commission proceedings against Swe-
dish electricity Transmission System Operator concerning limiting interconnector capacity for 
electricity exports (moving internal congestions to borders). Already mentioned possible split-
ting of Germany resulted in ACER’s and ENTSO-E’s market and technical reports published 
in the beginning of 2014 showing that current bidding zone configuration in Central-Europe is 
hampering progress in the implementation of the Electricity Target Model. ACER’s yearly 
monitoring reports contain enough evidence showing that the bidding zones configuration 
needs to be redefined. ENTSO-E’s technical report shows that, in most areas, not all available 
tools (such as grid reinforcement and/or development) have been used before considering 
such a step. The review process on different bidding zone configurations should be completed 
by March 2015 and include stakeholder involvement. The data collected are not always com-
parable and are not interpreted in the same way by all parties, especially depending on which 
side of border stakeholder is located. EURELECTRIC believes that reducing/splitting bidding 
zones should be considered only in case of structural congestions which are expected to en-
dure into the future. Andročec, I., et al.: Mechanisms for Efficient Investments and Optimal Zones in... 
758  THERMAL SCIENCE: Year 2014, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 757-770 
Additional criteria for optimal expansion of regional power system 
Congestion management is one of the main concerns. It has an impact on the level of 
electricity prices and it should be a key instrument for determining investments in generation and 
transmission. Today, each area has its own clearing rules and its own allocation techniques. The 
challenges are therefore to study and implement new options that would increase overall 
electricity market efficiency and reduce congestion costs significantly. The successful 
implementation of flow-based market coupling approach should be extended to address 
congestion management, balancing markets and capacity reserve markets within a joint unified 
approach all over Europe leading to a set of coherent interacting tools able to address all these 
complex issues at once.  
Given a congested two node network the marginal increase of capacity will provide the 
investor with a dividend equal to the shadow price of the transmission constraint if he is rewarded 
by a financial transmission right (fig. 1). Extension will take place until the costs for new capacity 
equals the shadow price of congestion. In contracts an incumbent will weigh the investment costs 
with the reduction of congestion rent from its inframarginal units [4, 5]. 
 
Figure 1. Social welfare and congestion cost connected with investment in cross-border 
interconnection [4, 5] (for color image see journal web site) 
Congestion cost is a good measure from a society perspective, but not a fair measure 
of TSO short term performance. This indicator is affected by merit orders on both sides of the 
border which are the major drivers for congestion costs. Maximization of cross-border capaci-
ties has a clear value to cross-border trade and can to a large extent be influenced by TSO. A 
small improvement could increase available capacities across all timeframes (which can be a 
critical market benefit even if realized only for a few hours per day). But maximization of 
cross border capacities at all costs should not be rewarded. 
Real congestion rent usually remains below the theoretically possible congestion 
rent. There are several reasons for this. Capacity is not always available due to outages or due 
to curtailment of capacity for network security reasons. Another reason is that in most Euro-
pean interconnections congestion rent is not gathered from implicit auctions but from explicit 
auctions or from a combination of these two types of auctions. Explicit auctions give a con-
gestion rent based on traders' estimate of the price difference, not on the final price difference. Andročec, I., et al.: Mechanisms for Efficient Investments and Optimal Zones in... 
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Usually implicit auctions give a higher rent for the TSO as in explicit auctions the uncertain-
ties for traders are higher.  
As congestion revenues indicate how much market participants value the possibility 
for cross-border trade, congestion rent could be a good criterion to determine at which inter-
connection capacity should be increased. Congestion rent can be easily compared with the 
cost of any potential investment to remove congestion. In many countries congestion rents are 
collected from several borders. An interconnector investment affects the market price and 
thus also affects congestion rents at all borders, not only at the border at which the new inter-
connector is built. Thus it is necessary to take into account the combined effect, not just the 
increase of congestion rents at one border. It has been discussed whether the whole transmis-
sion infrastructure could be financed through congestion rents. A general conclusion of this 
discussion has been that even if a considerable share of the investments can be made using 
congestion rents, it is usually not possible to cover all transmission costs from them. The con-
gestion rent declines when the cross-border capacity is close to the price convergence level. 
This decrease in congestion revenues could discourage TSO to invest up to the overall welfare 
optimum level. TSO not interested in undertaking efficient investment projects would have to 
transfer the congestion rents to a “Regional Interconnection Fund” to finance other intercon-
nection projects of regional interest. 
By using investment indicator the costs and benefits (= social welfare) of an invest-
ment would be weighed against each other. This general principle of comparing costs and 
benefits of market integration measures taken should theoretically be part of all indicators. 
However, defining the benefits and costs within this indicator is the key issue with regard to 
its implementation [6]. 
Social welfare generated by cross-border flows is a very good measure from a socie-
ty perspective. However, this indicator is also dependent on external factors (e. g. change in 
demand and supply curves). Some definitions of a market benefit include an aspect of facili-
tating competition in the generation of electricity. It is difficult to well-define any metric sole-
ly relating to facilitation of competition. If transmission reinforcement has minimized conges-
tion, that has facilitated competition in generation to the greatest extent possible. The reduc-
tion of congestions is an indicator of social and economic welfare assuming equitable distri-
bution of benefits under the goal of the European Union to develop an integrated market (per-
fect market assumption). This indicator has been already explained before. 
The social and economic welfare benefit is calculated from the reduction in total 
generation costs associated with the grid transfer capabilities (GTC) variation that the project 
allows. By removing network bottlenecks that restrict the access of generation to the full Eu-
ropean market, a project can facilitate increased competition between generators, reducing the 
cost of electricity to end consumers. Similarly, a project can contribute to reduced costs by 
providing a direct system connection to new, relatively low cost, generation. This cost reduc-
tion is calculated from an economic assessment to determine the optimum cost of total gen-
eration dispatch, with and without the project. 
It is interesting to note that increased interconnection capacity does not automatical-
ly lead to increased welfare to consumers when summing up the effect on both sides of the 
border. For example if the supply curve in the exporting country is very steep and in the im-
porting country very gradual, the result of building an interconnector is a substantial price 
increase in the exporting country but only a slight price decrease in the importing country. In 
these circumstances, overall social welfare for consumers will be reduced while overall social 
welfare for producers will be increased. An inversed slope of the supply curves would give Andročec, I., et al.: Mechanisms for Efficient Investments and Optimal Zones in... 
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the opposite result. This analysis only takes into account the effect on the electricity market in 
the respective countries caused by the new interconnector. A corresponding case is illustrated 
by fig. 2, which shows the impact of an (additional) exchange between two countries (for 
example cable between Italy and Croatia). While exports lead to increased production costs in 
country 2 (Croatia), these are significantly lower than the corresponding reduction of produc-
tion costs in country 1 (Italy). In contrast, while imports have only a negligible impact on 
market prices and thus market payments in country 1, they result in marked increase of the 
market price and thus market payments in the much smaller country 2. Under these circums-
tances, the market may actually see higher costs; in some cases, we have actually observed 
corresponding effects in our simulations as well. It is therefore important to note that any 
changes in market payments are not only a function of changes in costs, but that they also 
signal a redistribution of income between producers and consumers. 
 
Figure 2. Case of increasing market payments under reduced congestion [7] 
(for color image see journal web site) 
The main role of power plants and interconnectors is, in addition to providing sys-
tem security back-up to national systems, to optimize the overall system by allowing some 
higher cost generators to be replaced by lower cost generators in the regional dispatch. This 
means that a regional approach based on optimizing social welfare when deciding on building 
an interconnector or power plant is very appropriate. So if the investor goals in investment are 
the same as increase of social welfare this investment needs to be prioritized on regional level. 
The long run general equilibrium consequences of any voluntary trade are always beneficial. 
This is due to the fact that resources in the importing country can be reallocated to be better 
used in other sectors, and in the exporting country resources will be allocated to the electricity 
industry from less value creating sectors. It is very difficult to forecast the generation mix for 
the lifetime of a transmission investment. Also, the supply curve is dynamic in time, for ex-
ample the gas, coal and emission allowance price fluctuations modify the supply curve conti-
nuously. Further, the merit order of power plants can change over time. It is important to note 
that, contrary to power plant profitability, interconnector profitability is not dependent on the 
absolute levels of market prices but on the price difference between two markets. The advan-
tage of using real bids instead of synthetic supply curves is that they include the strategic 
behavior of companies [8]. 
The criteria based on social welfare could be one of set of criteria for optimal expan-
sion of regional power system. An interconnector between two price zones with a price dif-
ference will allow generators in the low price zone to supply load in the high price zone. This 
will result in an increase of overall social welfare if the net increase in producer surplus, con-Andročec, I., et al.: Mechanisms for Efficient Investments and Optimal Zones in... 
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sumer surplus and congestion rent is higher than the investment costs. However, there can be 
important distributional effects. In the low price zone, part of the consumer surplus will be 
transferred to the producer surplus as the price increases. Equally, in the high price zone part 
of the producer surplus will be transferred to the consumer surplus, as the price decreases [9]. 
Combination of incentive schemes into one index for cross-border trade: 
 
1
Index for market integration   wight  indicator 
n
i
ii
=
=× ∑   (1)
For example, different incentives could be weighted 0.5 for social welfare and con-
gestion cost respectively – depending on influence of these signals on regional market. So, for 
different regional markets this could be weighted differently. 
A merchant investor might decide to invest in an interconnector if the project yields 
a positive net present value. The appropriate discount rate will depend on the weighted aver-
age cost of capital (WACC) of the investor, possibly adjusted for the project specific level of 
risk. To determine the cash flows, the (estimated) costs of building and operating the inter-
connector are compared to the (estimated) private benefits, i. e. either the difference between 
prices at either end of the interconnector multiplied by the flow (congestion rent) or a regu-
lated usage tariff multiplied by the flow. 
In general there are no economic incentives for investing in cross-border transmis-
sion capacity. The only situation where incentives exist is to build transmission capacity from 
a country with lower prices and excess capacity (e. g. Norway) to a country with high prices 
short of generation capacities (e. g. The Netherlands) – see tab. 1. However, also in this case 
the uncertainty for any investor is very high because there is no guarantee at all that this price 
difference will prevail. 
A generation company or a 
big consumer would be a natural 
candidate for building merchant 
interconnectors. They could 
themselves benefit from the 
interconnector capacity for addi-
tional exports or imports. Even 
more important could be the 
influence on prices in the price 
zones which the interconnector 
is connecting. A generator 
would build export capacity to 
increase the price level in its 
own zone. Thus the logic of a generation company building a merchant line would be quite 
similar to the logic of a vertically integrated TSO building the line. The difference is in the 
treatment of congestion rents which in the case of a TSO are considered to be part of the regu-
lated income but in the case of a merchant investor can generate non-regulated profits, de-
pending on the exemption decision. 
By splitting up a single bidding zone along structural grid congestions different pric-
es will evolve in the splitted areas. Thus, higher electricity prices in the congested (generation 
deficit) bidding zones will give locational signals to generators to invest in this zone. As a 
consequence new generation capacities near the load will reduce load flows from other areas 
and reduce congestion [11]. 
Table 1. Investment example Netherlands-Norway (NorNed 
cable) – 580 km, 400 kV, 700 MW, €300 million [10] 
Yearly effects of investment  Amount 
 [€ Million] 
Investment cost
 Cost of connecting NorNed to Dutch grid 
 Cost already made in preparation 
 
 Gross trading margin 
 Loss of power due to heating of the line 
 Consumer surplus Netherlands 
 Producer surplus Netherlands 
 Security of supply 
248 
25 
24 
 
41 
4 
52 
–50 
4 Andročec, I., et al.: Mechanisms for Efficient Investments and Optimal Zones in... 
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Discussion on benefits from interconnector economics (between two areas) is avail-
able in [12]. Costs and benefits from exchange between hydropower system and thermal pow-
er system for example of NorNed or BritNed evaluation is shown in [13]. There should be 
consistency between expected benefits and the risk-adjustment of the discount rate in an eco-
nomic cost-benefit analysis [14]. 
While market coupling is an unequivocally good thing for cross-border trading effi-
ciencies, it poses an additional challenge for merchant projects since the revenues for inter-
connector owners will stem directly from the uncertain and volatile price differentials in the 
day-ahead auctions typically used to couple markets. Market coupling without accompanying 
hedging or long-term contracting options has a significant impact on attracting merchant in-
vestment and financing, as well as covering costs. Merchant interconnectors with debt finance 
will need to be financed or operated as infrastructure investments with very conservative 
lender risk appetite, which is a requirement to be at the fully contracted end of the spectrum of 
earnings profiles in order to receive an investment-grade credit rating and associated debt 
terms [15]. 
Examples of definition on bidding zones and impacts on 
investment decisions and trading 
We assume that 4 TSO are involved on the basis of example from [3] and [16]. The 
calculations are based on optimal power flow, which means that the nodal prices reflect mar-
ginal cost and/or marginal willingness to pay in every node. That implies optimal dispatch. A 
MATLAB algorithm is used to find the optimal load flow and the corresponding nodal prices 
in every node in the network. 
In the base case on fig. 3 we can see that the area 1 is the lowest price area, the area 
4 is the highest, and 2 and 3 are between. In the area 2, generator 3 is not running because it is 
the most expensive, as well 
as the second generator in 
node 11. Generator 1 and the 
first generator in node 11 are 
running on maximum capaci-
ty because they are the cheap-
est. The congestion occurs 
between areas 3 and 4. Tran-
sit (minimum of import/ 
/export) is 237 MW in area 1 
and 51 MW in area 2. The 
area 3 is an export region and 
the area 4 an import region. 
Total flow between areas is 
999 MW, accounting for 
12.5% of actual generation. 
Due to losses (total losses are 
89 MW), there will be 
slightly less power sold at the 
high price end then bought at 
the low price end, but that is 
 
Figure 3. AC OPF in base case scenario of 11 nodes and 
4 zones example Andročec, I., et al.: Mechanisms for Efficient Investments and Optimal Zones in... 
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overcompensated for by the price difference. Total costs in the system are 150,539 EUR/h, 
minimum nodal price is 21.7 and maximum 26.3 EUR/MWh. 
If we define zones according to the principle if nodal prices are similar then we need 
to see what is similar. In first definition we will define it as “if difference between nodal pric-
es is less than 0.5 €/MWh then nodal prices combine one zone”. 
According to this principle results of defining zones are shown on fig. 4(a). We have 
formed 6 zones whit different prices. Area 1 and area 3 splits into two zones each promoting 
export generators. Area 4 has been coupled with half of area 2 concerning the interest of im-
porting consumers. So in general, social welfare of this region is increased due to higher sur-
pluses than in fixed zones. TSO should in this case receive lower congestion rent due to less 
difference in prices, except between 10 and 11 where economic signal for transmission in-
vestment is stronger. Stronger investment signal is also in zone 6-7-11 for increase of cheaper 
generator. 
 
Figure 4. Formation of 6 smaller zones according to nodal prices and without definition of area 
(country) borders (a) and formation of 3 bigger zones according to nodal prices (b) 
In second definition we will define the zones as “if difference between nodal prices 
is less than 1 €/MWh then nodal prices combine one zone”. According to this principle results 
of defining zones are shown on fig. 4(b). We have formed 3 zones whit different prices. This 
is probably more appropriate for market participants due to fewer zones, especially for intro-
duction of financial transmission rights. It is clear improvement for electricity trading but the 
economic signals are less strong then in previous case, so the market participants receive little 
bit less feasible results for going into investments. 
If we reduce the interconnection capacity between areas by half, the situation will 
not be too much different: the flow between areas will be reduced by 50 MW, and nodal pric-
es will range from 21.4 to 26.6 EUR/MWh. However, we can see that the costs and revenues 
in the areas will be different and thanks to the congestion that occurs on line 10-11 (between 
areas 3 and 4).  Should there be no connection between areas, total costs would increase by Andročec, I., et al.: Mechanisms for Efficient Investments and Optimal Zones in... 
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6,458 EUR/h, and nodal prices will range from 17.9 to 36.4 EUR/MWh. The highest price is 
in area 4 because the expensive generator needs to be in operation. In this particular case, we 
can see that there would be winners and losers in the areas if we don’t have interconnected 
areas. So, there is a visible advantage of interconnected areas, where the cheapest generators 
will be used first – that is an advantage of electricity trading. On the other hand, customers in 
export areas (area 1 and area 3) will have cheaper price if they are not connected to other 
areas. But, in that case generators will not have the opportunity to increase generator’s surplus 
and, consequently, social welfare will be reduced. We can also notice that the area 3 will have 
biggest benefit of connected areas because in the base case they are connected with the area 4 
and via this line they can increase the social welfare. Here we have the signal of maximizing 
social welfare and that is an advantage of regional market. 
In the case illustrated on fig. 
5 we have split upper zones into 
more flexible ones and we have 
received the highest price not in 
11 as in previous cases but in 5 
which became separate zone and 
market participants received 
strong signal for investments. 
Social welfare has been reduced 
due to higher congestion costs 
and TSO receive more revenue 
than before. In this case regula-
tor should decide if it is more 
appropriate to invest in transmis-
sion or in cheaper generator. If 
this is only temporary conges-
tion, it could be seen that welfare 
reduction is concentrated only on 
small part (one node) of the re-
gional power system, and the 
rest of region has still benefits of 
flexible definition of zones. In 
all this cases zones on the bot-
tom of region are fixed, which can show the difference between structural and temporary 
problems in the power system. 
It is clear that different ways of dividing the grid into zones, and also to determine transfer 
limits between zones, lead to quite different market outcomes and regional signals. For re-
gional market is illustrated that in these case market results are more approached to use of the 
cheapest generators (power plants) which maximize social welfare. Further work is needed to 
test proposed mechanisms in real system (Regional or/and European model). From regional 
solution(s) we need to find efficient and market participants „friendly” single European solu-
tion. 
Security of supply in regional power market  
Regional energy market is about investments, economic development, security of 
energy supply and social stability. Efficient cross-border electricity trade increase regional 
Figure 5. Formation of 6 bigger zones in case of 
additional congestion Andročec, I., et al.: Mechanisms for Efficient Investments and Optimal Zones in... 
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market integration. For more benefits from electricity trade we need more investments. Inte-
ractions between decentralized decisions of participants and mechanisms have different costs 
and benefits for participants. The objectives defined in the regional energy strategy are creat-
ing competitive integrated energy market, attracting investments in energy and providing 
secure and sustainable energy supply. Improving energy security implies, among others, to 
promote diversity, efficiency and flexibility within the energy sectors of the areas in region, to 
be prepared to respond to energy related emergencies, and not least to promote regional co-
operation with all players in the energy markets. Energy security is closely associated with 
timely investments in energy supply in line with economic development and environmental 
needs. That includes connecting new generation and transmission capacities, integrating ener-
gy markets, enhancing the security of supply, and improving the reliability and quality of 
energy services provided [17]. 
Security of supply is the ability of a power system to provide an adequate and secure 
supply of electricity in normal conditions, in a specific area. Security of supply indicator is 
deriving an estimation of security of supply improvement from the market based simulation 
results when a generation or transmission investment project is implemented. Tighter and 
stronger coordination between regional market participants should improve all this mechan-
isms and regional cooperation should improve investment levels and security of supply. 
EU Directive 2005/89/EC establishes measures aimed at safeguarding security of 
electricity supply so as to ensure the proper functioning of the EU internal market for electric-
ity, an adequate level of interconnection between Member States, an adequate level of genera-
tion capacity and balance between supply and demand. When adopting policy implementation 
measures, Member States must take certain elements into account, in particular the need to 
[18] ensure continuity of electricity supplies, study the internal market and the possibilities for 
cross-border cooperation in relation to security of electricity supply; reduce the long-term 
effects of growth of electricity demand; introduce a degree of diversity in electricity genera-
tion in order to ensure a reasonable balance between different primary fuels; promote energy 
efficiency and the use of new technologies; continuously renew transmission and distribution 
networks to maintain performance. 
The Electricity Directive 2009/72/EC already envisages Tender Procedures for new 
generation capacity in the interest of security of supply. So, security of supply consists of five 
“A” elements [19]: 
–  availability: availability and physical existence of sufficient energy sources; giving priority 
to domestic energy resources, 
–  accessibility: access to cross-border interconnectors, domestic infrastructure, storage fa-
cilities and supply routes with sufficient capacity and non-discriminatory access, 
–  affordability: prices for energy supply and transport services shall be transparent at rea-
sonable costs, 
–  acceptability: exploration and exploitation must be environmentally sound and taking into 
account sustainability, 
–  adaptability: ensuring of technical integrity (codes and standards) and quality of energy 
(physical and chemical composition) among interconnected energy systems. 
In short-term security focus mainly on the risk of technical failure in the system (op-
erational), extreme weather conditions or sudden import disruptions – quantifying supply 
disruptions. In medium-term: A supply disruption from major supply sources and recurring or 
chronic supply shortages, such as those for electricity – assessing system adequacy to serve 
demand. In long-term: strategic long-term planning of resources, such as available gas re-Andročec, I., et al.: Mechanisms for Efficient Investments and Optimal Zones in... 
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serves, import routes, etc. – devising strategies and policies for the next 10-20 years. Some 
results of security of supply indicators project are available in [19]. 
All indicators need to have weighted average which says how much impact it has on 
security of supply. The best test of these indicators is scenario when we have maximum load 
with extreme cold weather conditions (winter) or extreme hot weather conditions (summer) or 
when we have minimum load (during spring). So, combinations of these aggregate indicators 
with weighted average for each of them could give the best performance for security of 
supply. 
An energy(-only) market should be able to deliver resource adequacy and system flexibili-
ty, if: 
–  the market is allowed to function unhindered, 
–  demand is able to respond and actually    
responds to (short-term) price signals,  
–  prices are allowed to vary freely, according to the interplay of demand and supply, 
–  at times of scarcity, prices could increase up to the level of VoLL, presented in fig. 6.  
VoLL is explained with the following equation: 
 
f_e l u b p o p
tot
GDP (1 ) s hf n w
VoLL
EC
+−
=   (2) 
where VoLL [kWh] is the value of lost load, GDP [€] – the gross domestic product, ECtot 
[kWh] – the total annual electricity consumption, hf_el [hour] – the hours of free time depen-
dent on electricity, fsub [€/h] – the factor of substitution for electrical free time, npop is popula-
tion, and w – the average wage after taxes. 
Investors have confidence in a stable policy and regulatory regime, that policymak-
ers and regulators will resist the temptation to intervene when prices reach and remain at very 
high levels, investors are satisfied that the return to their investment comes from infrequent 
price spikes. As long as these conditions are not met, there is no guarantee, even once the EU 
electricity market integration process is completed, that an energy-only market will be able by 
itself to deliver the required level of resource adequacy and system flexibility. The full com-
patibility of any capacity remuneration arrangement with the internal energy market should be 
ensured. An enabling investment climate 
should promote the participation of new tech-
nologies and demand response in ancillary 
services markets [1]. 
VOLL is presenting price of not supplied 
kWh. Estimation of VOLL in international 
studies is from minimal 3 €/kWh till 12 €/kWh 
(fig. 6). In South East Europe Region we can 
estimate that VOLL is minimal 4 €/kWh. 
Improved Security of Supply (SoS): Ade-
quacy measures the ability of a power system 
to supply demand in full, at the current state of 
network availability; the power system can be 
said to be in an N-0 state. Security measures 
the  ability of a power system to meet  demand  
 
Figure 6. Estimation of VoLL (value of
lost load) [20] Andročec, I., et al.: Mechanisms for Efficient Investments and Optimal Zones in... 
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in full and to continue to do so under all 
credible contingencies of single transmis-
sion  faults;  such a system is said to be 
N-1 secure. Security of Supply is the 
ability of a power system to provide an 
adequate and secure supply of electricity 
in normal conditions, in a specific area. 
The assessment shall be focused on a 
delimited geographical area. The boun-
dary of the area may consist of the nodes 
of a quasiradial sub-system or semi-
isolated area (e. g. with a single 400 kV 
injection). The system is at risk if the given contingency criteria are not fulfilled during 10 
years following its commissioning. As an example, a simple indicator is shown in fig. 7 – 
deriving an estimation of security of supply improvement from the market based simulation 
results (a duration curve of power flow in a cross-section under study) when a project is im-
plemented. Grid transfer capabilities with (GTC) the project have to be known. 
Inclusion of risk management  
With higher risk profiles, investors are looking for earnings based on both the value 
of interconnector capacity driven by underlying price differentials (intrinsic) and volatility 
(extrinsic) to justify higher returns. In addition, at the more conservative end of the lending 
spectrum, investors will want to be exposed to very few market risks but, at the same time, 
there is inevitably higher risk in the extent to which extrinsic value will be realized. While 
market coupling is an unequivocally good thing for cross-border trading efficiencies, it poses 
an additional challenge for investment projects since the revenues for interconnector owners 
will stem directly from the uncertain and volatile price differentials in the day-ahead auctions 
typically used to couple markets. Market coupling without accompanying hedging or long-
term contracting options has a significant impact on attracting investment and financing, as 
well as covering costs [15]. 
An FTR (financial transmission right) relates to a zone-to-zone transaction, without 
having to specify by what route the electricity travels from one zone to the other. This benefits 
both the TSO in being able better to calculate ATC, and the user, as not having to worry about the 
specific route either. A market in financial derivatives organized by third parties can offer cross-
border hedging possibilities for market participants like CfD (Contract for Differences). A con-
tract for differences (CfD) means that two counterparties voluntarily agree an equalization pay-
ment between themselves that converts future exposure to a variable price into a fixed price. CfD 
can be purchased to hedge spatial price differences between price areas. It is also possible to 
hedge the price area risk by trading a set of CfD for the difference between the system price 
and the different area prices. 
Financial transmission rights (FTR) obligation is right to collect payment from (or an 
obligation to pay) the price difference associated with transmission congestion between destina-
tion and origin for a specified contract quantity. Financial transmission rights (FTR) option is 
right to collect payment from the price difference associated with transmission congestion be-
tween destination and origin for a specified contract quantity. If the price difference is negative 
the payoff is zero. CfD cannot replace transmission rights because there is not a natural balance 
between supply and demand in all bidding zones and therefore no balance between natural buy-
Figure 7. Security of supply indicator [6] Andročec, I., et al.: Mechanisms for Efficient Investments and Optimal Zones in... 
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ers/sellers of CfD. TSOs are natural sellers of transmission capacity and shall sell transmission 
rights between all bidding zones. A system of financial transmission rights (FTR) is created to 
enable generators to hedge uncertainty in congestion costs. These rights would be defined as 
point-to-point or point-to-region rights that would pay the difference between one location’s price 
and the price at the second location or a weighted average of prices for several locations, respec-
tively. 
A measure to solve this issue would be a Financial Transmission Right compensating 
the price differential between one locational area price and a system price for the coupled market 
area (usually a volume weighted average of the locational prices in the area). However such a 
solution would require a strong cooperation as receivers of individual congestion rents and payers 
to FTR holders would fall apart. A joint collection and compensation mechanism of all TSO 
involved in the flow based market coupling would be needed. A potential structure for a compen-
sation funds is depicted in fig. 8. 
 
Figure 8. Financial transmission rights and contracts for differences [21] 
(for color image see journal web site) 
An FTR is a right to claim a sum of money equivalent to the value of the congestion 
surplus. If you are a generator located in the low price area, you are indifferent between ac-
tually exporting into the high price area, or selling at the lower price and taking the value of 
the FTR. If you are a load customer in the high price area, you are indifferent between import-
ing from the low price area, or buying in the high price area and earning the value of the FTR. 
Thus an FTR is equivalent to a financial product that is equal in value terms to having access 
to the interconnector. But it only works well to the extent that robust market prices are estab-
lished on either side of the link, and there is a coupling process to link the two markets. The 
payout of the FTR is the price differential between the sink and source times the FTR volume 
(MW). In the case of the FTR options if the sink source price differential is negative then the 
FTR payout is zero. On the other hand, FTR obligations can either have a negative or positive 
payout depending on the area price difference and the directional definition of the FTR. Andročec, I., et al.: Mechanisms for Efficient Investments and Optimal Zones in... 
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Conclusions 
European solution for electricity market integration is converting to one possible so-
lution with its positive and negative implications on cross border electricity trading develop-
ment. Costs and benefits are illustrated with impacts on different market participants (genera-
tors, suppliers, TSO) in different examples. Different ways of dividing the grid into zones, 
and also to determine transfer limits between zones, lead to quite different market outcomes. 
The correct definition of bidding areas is a crucial element of market design to ensure eco-
nomically efficient and secure operation of the interconnected power system, as well as cor-
rect pricing of capacities. It is shown more efficient method for optimal zones in a way of 
splitting on more flexible areas with its prices based on location of congestions and nodal 
prices. 
Additional criteria for power system expansion are defined with best performance of 
their combination and especially taking into account social welfare and socio-economic con-
gestion costs. Choice of additional criteria for optimal power system expansion depends on 
several indicators like number of congested hours, congestion costs, maximization of social 
welfare, complex and simple investment indicator, optimization of the distribution of trans-
mission capacities among the different timeframes, improved security of supply and others. It 
is possible to use combination of incentive schemes into one index for cross-border trade. 
Combination of aggregate indicators with weighted average for each of them could give the 
best performance for security of supply in regional electricity market. 
Inclusion of risk management for few trading areas includes use of financial trans-
mission rights like weighted average of prices for several areas, respectively. Further work is 
needed to test proposed mechanisms in real system (Regional or/and European model). From 
regional solution(s) we need to find efficient & market participants „friendly” single Euro-
pean solution. 
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